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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the long-term performance of cross-delisted firms from U.S. stock 
markets. Using a sample of foreign firms listed and delisted from U.S. stock exchange 
markets over 2000-2012, we examine the operating performance and the long-run stock 
returns performance of firms post-cross-delisting. Our results suggest that cross-delisted 
firms have less growth opportunities than matched cross-listed firms in the long run. 
Moreover, firms that cross-delist after the passage of Rule 12h-6 of 2007 exhibit a 
significant decline in operating performance. In contrast, before the adoption of the Rule 
12h-6, cross-delisted firms seem to be affected by the cost of a U.S. listing in the pre-
cross-delisting period. In addition, we provide evidence that cross-delisted firms 
underperform their cross-listed peers; cross-delisted firms experience negative average 
abnormal returns, especially in the post-delisting period.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States (U.S.) stock exchanges, namely the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the NASDAQ together, have the largest number of foreign listings for a 
given country. Foreign companies can access to the U.S. exchange markets by obtaining 
or issuing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)1 and are required to register with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)2. In fact, the motivation and effects of 
cross-listings equity in U.S. exchanges have been extensively analyzed (e.g., Karolyi 
(2012)). 
However, the number of foreign firms on U.S. exchanges has been decreasing in the 
last decade. According to the World Federation of Exchanges3 statistics bureau, in 2000 
there were registered about 970 foreign firms and in 2012 there were only about 814, 
meaning that more foreign firms delisted than listed on U.S. markets during that period.   
Therefore, our study contributes with new evidence about post-operating 
performance and long-run stock returns performance of cross-delisted firms from U.S. 
exchange markets. A foreign firm will delist and terminate the SEC registration when 
the costs of a cross-listing outweigh the benefits. However, the SEC deregistration 
process was very difficult before the passage of Rule 12h-6 of March 21, 2007, which 
made it easier for a foreign firm to deregister. Consistent with the notion of balancing 
costs and benefits of a U.S. exchange listing, previous studies reveal that foreign firms 
with specific characteristics are more likely to delist and to deregister. For example, 
Marosi and Massoud (2008) provide evidence that small foreign firms with low trading 
volume, with relatively low cross-listing premium, firms from industries in which 
takeover activity by foreign acquirers of U.S. targets is also relatively low, and with 
                                                           
1
 Foreign firms can obtain or issue equity financing by using Level 1, 2 or 3 ADRs. Level-1 ADR it is the only ADR’ Level that 
may be unsponsored and, as a result, may be quoted only on the OTC market, such as OTCBB, OTCQX or Pink Sheets. A level-2 
ADR provides shares listed and traded on the U.S. exchange markets. The Level-3 ADR is used when a company has made a public 
offering in the U.S. See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreign-private-issuers-overview.shtml. 
2
 Foreign firms that have its securities listed on a U.S. exchange market and on the Over-The-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) are 
required (under Section 12 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) to fill periodically the Form 20-F (or 40-F for Canadian 
companies) and to fill Form 6-K for any relevant public information (i.e., relevant by any stock exchange on which a company’s 
securities are traded) with the SEC. Furthermore, companies must register securities under the 1933 Securities Act when offering to 
sell securities in U.S. exchanges. In addition, a public offering demands to fill forms F-1, F-3, F-4, F-6 and F-8. Companies can 
register without any active listing and can delist without deregister. See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreign-
private-issuers-overview.shtml. 
3
 http://www.world-exchanges.org. 
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greater degree of insider control are more likely to deregister. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 
(2010) find that firms that deregister should have poor growth opportunities and hence 
raise few or no external funds at the time of deregistration and are not expected to do so 
in the future. Overall, much of this previous evidence is still consistent with the 
predictions of the “bonding” theory (e.g., Marosi and Massoud (2008), Doidge, Karolyi 
and Stulz (2010), Fernandes, Lel and Miller (2010)).  
However, research is still scarce regarding the determinants of cross-delisting and 
little is known about the economic aftermath of cross-delisting. Thus, our study adds to 
the literature by providing evidence on the long-term performance of firms post-cross-
delisting. Using a sample of foreign firms that listed and delisted from U.S. exchange 
markets over 2000-2012, we first investigate the motivations for cross-delisting and 
deregistration to identify the characteristics of firms that delisted in the pre- and in the 
post-Rule 12h-6, since it changed the procedure to terminate registration with the SEC. 
Cross-delisting and deregistration may be voluntary or involuntary. Obviously, the most 
relevant group is the voluntary one, since the involuntary group includes firms that were 
forced to leave the U.S. exchanges and to terminate the SEC registration. Foreign firms, 
like U.S.-based firms, can be suspended and delisted for not filling the requirements 
imposed by SEC regulations and other rules established by the U.S. exchange markets4. 
Therefore, those firms belong to the involuntary group. We will focus our analysis on 
cross-delisted firms because delisting is usually a first step prior to deregistration and 
the motivations are basically the same.  
We conduct our empirical tests using a treatment group of 583 cross-delisted firms 
and a control sample of 564 firms that remaining cross-listed on U.S. markets. We 
implement the propensity score matching (PSM) technique to reduce the selection bias 
and make both treatment and control groups more similar. We find that cross-delisted 
firms have less growth opportunities than a matched group of cross-listed firms, in the 
long-run. This result is significant for firms that voluntarily cross-delisted after the 
passage the Rule 12h-6, but is insignificant for firms that cross-delisted before. 
Moreover, voluntary cross-delisted firms after the Rule 12h-6 underperform cross-listed 
firms regarding operating efficiency and profitability. However, before the passage of 
                                                           
4
 According to NYSE and NASDAQ Rules, a foreign stock can be suspended or delisted for falling below certain quantitative and 
qualitative continued listing criteria, such as the number of total shareholders, average monthly trading volume, number of publicly-
held shares, average global market capitalization, and minimum bid price.  
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the Rule 12h-6, our results suggest that there is a cost that foreign companies bear while 
cross-listed in a U.S. exchange market: one year after delisting, cross-delisted firms 
(before the Rule 12h-6) show higher profitability growth rates than comparable cross-
listed firms, and this evidence remains up three years after delisting. A reasonable 
explanation for this evidence is that for this group of cross-delisted firms the cost of a 
U.S. listing outweighs the benefit.  
In addition to the operating analysis, we also investigate the long-run stock returns 
performance of cross-delisted firms. We therefore follow Barber and Lyon (1997) and 
measure abnormal returns as the difference in one-year holding period returns between 
cross-delisted firms and a matched group of cross-listed firms. Consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Loughran and Vijh (1997)) we apply a matching approach based on the 
market value of equity and the book-to-market ratio. We find that cross-delisted firms 
underperform their comparable cross-listed firms; cross-delisted firms experience 
negative average abnormal return, especially in the post-delisting period.  
The remaining of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
literature pointing out the main hypotheses that explain the benefits and costs of cross-
listing and about the determinants of cross-delisting and deregistration. Section 3 
outlines the data and describes the sample. Section 4 presents and describes 
methodology and empirical results. Finally, section 5 presents the main findings and 
concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Prior research on cross-listing provides evidence that a U.S. listing creates more 
incentives for firms to access external finance. Among several reasons for non–U.S. 
firms to cross-list into U.S. markets, some authors highlight that cross-listing overcomes 
barriers that segment capital markets, thus lowering information asymmetries (e.g., 
Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977), Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakirananan 
(1986), Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan (1987)), others stress the benefits from a 
lower cost of capital (e.g., Mittoo (1992), Fanto and Karmel (1997), Errunza and Miller 
(2000), Bancel and Mittoo (2001), Reese and Weisbach (2002), Hail and Leuz (2009)), 
and others point out that firms raise more external funds after they enter in the U.S. 
markets (e.g., Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005), Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2009)). 
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Nevertheless, Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) argue that the main motivation for a 
firm to cross-list in a U.S. exchange market is driven by shareholders’ legal protection. 
To overcome their corporate governance problems, firms can cross-list in capital 
markets with stronger legal and financial institutions, such as U.S. exchange markets 
that are subject to the public enforcement of the SEC; these mandatory regulations 
reduce the ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders. Hence, corporate boards “bond” themselves to better governance 
which benefits minority shareholders. In sum, the “bonding” hypothesis postulates that 
a legal regime that protects minority shareholders provides a decrease in information 
asymmetries costs, thus lowering the cost of capital. Furthermore, the “bonding” effect 
may arise at both legal and reputational levels. Coffee (1999, 2002) emphasized the 
evidence of a legal “bonding” based on the argument that better enforcement of legal 
requirements provided by U.S. Institutions results in better corporate governance 
mechanisms due to a more demanding litigation environment increased by SEC’s 
enforcement, which in turn demands enhanced disclosure and reconciliation to U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). In addition, firms may also adopt a 
set of “bonding” activities that help the firm building its image of a well-governed 
corporation. Hence, the prospect of creating reputational capital (Stulz, 1999) induces 
the firm to observe certain standards that it is not forced to follow, as hiring reputable 
intermediaries such as investment bankers (e.g., Loureiro (2010)), auditors (e.g., Coffee 
(2002)), analyst coverage (e.g., Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver (2002), Lang, Lins and 
Miller (2003), Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2005; 2004), Bailey, Karolyi and Salva 
(2006)), institutional investors (e.g., Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller (2004), Aggarwal, 
Dahiya and Klapper (2007)), and other capital market participants. Therefore, firms 
from countries with weaker investor protection regimes (e.g., from Civil Law countries) 
benefit more and are more likely to cross-list in countries such as the U.S. (e.g., La 
Porta et al. (1997; 1998)). The likelihood of cross-listing on a U.S. stock exchange is 
also higher for firms that have higher growth opportunities, which results in higher 
cross-list premium (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004). On the other side, a U.S. listing 
represents a cost for corporate insiders because it restricts their ability to consume 
private benefits (Karolyi, 2012). This argument is consistent with the lower likelihood 
of firms with a large controlling shareholder to cross-list in U.S. markets (e.g., Doidge 
(2004), Djankov et al. (2008), Doidge et al. (2009), Ayyagari and Doidge (2010)).  
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Nevertheless, since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley5 (SOX) Act in 2002, the 
debate is more centered on whether higher compliance costs, redundancies with home 
market requirements and difficulties in the SEC deregistration process was driving to a 
loss of competitiveness of U.S. stock exchanges. The adoption of SOX augmented the 
number of foreign firms that move from U.S. exchange markets to London and Hong 
Kong exchanges. Moreover, after the adoption of SOX, more foreign firms simply 
choose to market under the rule 144A (only among institutional investors), avoiding all 
the disclosure and compliance requirements associated with a public offering. Under the 
predictions of “bonding” hypothesis, SOX requirements can be seen as a boost to 
investor confidence, improving investor protection and increasing the premium for a 
U.S. listing (e.g., Berger, Li and Wong (2005)). This suggests that SOX should affect 
positively larger firms with a higher level of pre-SOX disclosure, while might affect in a 
negative way less fast-growing, more financially-constrained, large dominant 
shareholder block, riskier and smaller firms originated from countries with 
underdeveloped capital markets and with weaker shareholder protection (Karolyi, 
2012). On the other side of this debate, Zingales (2007) argues that for some foreign 
firms the compliance costs with SOX requirements outweigh the net benefits of a U.S. 
listing, which led those firms to choose to delist. He calls to this hypothesis the “loss of 
competitiveness hypothesis”, which suggests that firms that are negatively affected by 
SOX tend to delist from U.S. markets. However, delisting may be relatively costly from 
a reputational perspective due to the potential risk of alienating firms’ international 
investor base (Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003). Furthermore, delisting process does not 
remove the obligation to meet the SEC requirements, only deregistration6 process 
removes such obligation. Deregistering firms have characteristics that reduce the value 
of a cross-listing according to the “bonding” theory and generally market reacts 
negatively to deregistration announcements. Liu (2004) has investigated stock-price 
reactions of 103 foreign firms that involuntarily cross-delisted from U.S. markets over 
the 1990-2003 period and finds a 4.5% significant average decline. In the same period, 
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 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is a U.S. federal law that predicts enhanced standards for all public companies in U.S. 
6
 Before Rule 12h-6 of 2007, issuers can voluntarily apply for deregistration if a company is eligible for it, i.e., if a company no 
longer meets the requirements of Section 12 (g)-4: (i) a foreign company may deregister if there are fewer than 300 U.S. resident 
shareholders; (2) or, alternatively, if the company’s total assets in each of the three previous fiscal years are less than $US10 
million, the security class may be deregistered if there are fewer than 500 U.S. resident shareholders. To voluntarily terminate a 
listing, the NYSE requires that a firm gain the approval of its audit committee and Board of Directors before delisting, while 
NASDAQ simply requires a letter stating the reasons for delisting. See https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34-12g.pdf. 
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Witmer (2005) finds a 6% decline for a sample of 116 foreign firms that cross-delisted 
from U.S. exchange markets. Contrarily, Li (2014) and Smith (2008) show a positive 
post-SOX stock-price reaction, in contrast with an insignificant negative pre-SOX 
stock-price reaction around cross-delisting announcement. Chaplinsky and Ramchand 
(2009) provide the most extensive study about the characteristics of cross-delisted 
firms. The authors considered a total of 724 foreign firms that delisted over the period 
from 1961 to 2004, 48 of which are considered as voluntary cross-delistings. Their 
findings reveal that those firms delisting after SOX have lower profitability, are smaller, 
have lower median assets and market capitalization, poorer preceding stock-price 
performance, and lower analyst coverage; the only exception are firms that delist due to 
mergers and acquisitions processes, which are closer in profitability and growth 
opportunities to foreign firms that remained cross-listed. Their results also suggest that 
larger, more profitable firms, with proportionally more U.S. trading volume, and more 
capacity to raise capital are more likely to remain cross-listed. Voluntary cross-
delistings are more likely to occur for smaller, NASDAQ7 quoted firms, and in 
circumstances where there are more firms from the same country cross-listed. In their 
published version8, Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2012) show that the majority of firms 
that cross-delisted after SOX are from countries with stronger governance, and that have 
lower volume trading, lower analyst coverage and lower capital raising activity when 
comparing with cross-listed firms. Also Daugherty and Georgieva (2011) investigate the 
impact of SOX on the cross-delisting behavior and point out that the potential gains 
resulting from growth opportunities, country’s legal environment and the length of 
presence in the U.S. are the main determinants of the cross-delisting decision.  
On the side of deregistration, Marosi and Massoud (2008) concluded that post-SOX 
deregistration announcements have a less negative stock price effect than deregistration 
announcements in the pre-SOX period, consistent with stockholders recognizing the 
costs of SOX compliance. Their findings also suggest that the passage of SOX has 
reduced the net benefits of a U.S. exchange listing. This evidence is stronger for smaller 
firms, with lower trading volume and stronger inside control; those firms are more 
likely to deregister. Hostak et al. (2013) considered a sample of 84 voluntary foreign 
                                                           
7
 The NYSE is often considered to be more regulated, and more liquid than the NASDAQ exchange. NASDAQ may not provide the 
necessary “bonding” to justify the costs of cross-listing (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2009). 
8
 We refer to the working paper version of 2009 of this paper because the published version does not contain so much information 
about delisted foreign firms’ characteristics in the pre- and the post-SOX. 
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firms that deregistered after SOX and found a statistically significant negative stock-
price reaction around deregistration announcement. Their findings suggest that firms 
with weaker corporate governance deregister to avoid the governance requirements of 
SOX; they concluded that the decision of deregistration did not benefit minority 
shareholders.  
 
In the spirit of the legal “bonding”, an easier deregistration process decreases the 
value of “bonding” since it increases the chance that insiders will force a firm to 
deregister in order to consume more private benefits (Fernandes, Lel and Miller, 2010). 
And if listing costs are not considered to be relevant, minority shareholders of firms that 
deregistered are expected to be hurt by deregistration once it increases a corporate 
insider’s discretion to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Hostak et al., 2013). On the other side, costs imposed on foreign firms by SOX 
outweigh the benefits of a U.S. listing for a significant part of cross-listed companies. In 
order to “release” those companies from such significant costs, on March 21, 2007, the 
Rule 12h-69 made it easier the deregistration process, which triggered a wave of foreign 
firms that decided to leave U.S. exchange markets. More firms deregister after Rule 
12h-6 in 2007 than after SOX in 2002. In this context, Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2010) 
investigate the drivers and motivations of deregistration after the passage of Rule 12h-6. 
Their study identified 141 firms that deregistered from U.S. exchanges between 2002 
and 2008, 75 of which deregistered after the passage of Rule 12h-6 in 2007. They 
concluded that, overall, their findings are consistent with the “bonding” hypothesis; 
firms that deregister are expected to have low growth opportunities, a low financing 
deficit or a surplus, and evidence of agency costs. Moreover, they also investigate the 
market reactions to deregistration announcements and found that those reactions are 
negative before Rule 12h-6, but less negative after the passage of the Rule. In addition, 
they find no evidence supporting the prediction of the loss of competitiveness 
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 Under Rule 12h-6 of March, 21, 2007, foreign companies that have and maintain a foreign listing which is its primary trading 
market (for at least 12 months preceding deregistration), can qualify for deregistration if the average daily trading volume of the 
subject class in the U.S. for a recent 12-month period is no more than 5 percent of the average daily trading volume of that class of 
securities on a worldwide basis for the same period. Moreover, the registrant must not have sold securities in a registered offering in 
the U.S. during the 12 months preceding deregistration, except for specified exceptions noted in the Rule. In addition, a registrant 
must have at least one year of Exchange Act reporting, be current in filing all reports under the Exchange Act, and have filed at least 
one Exchange Act annual report. Previous Rule 12g-4 applies (with an easier method of counting U.S.-resident holders), but the new 
eligibility conditions also apply. See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreign-private-issuers-overview.shtml. 
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hypothesis, i.e., that stock price reactions to SOX affect the deregistration decision. 
Also Fernandes, Lel and Miller (2010) provide evidence supporting “bonding” 
hypothesis. They find that stock price reactions to the passage of Rule 12h-6 are 
significantly negative for firms from countries with weaker investor protection and poor 
disclosure requirements. In contrast, they find no significant market reaction for 
deregistered firms from strong investor protection regimes.  
 
Overall, previous findings indicate that cross-delisting and deregistration from U.S. 
stock markets are decisions driven by a combination of country’s legal origin, 
informational environment, and also of firm-level characteristics such as operating 
performance variables. Those performance drivers appear to be related with changes in 
investment activity, growth and profitability of operating activities, and the size and 
scope of capital-raising activities occurring during the listing. Taken as together, 
previous results reveal that greater size and stronger U.S. market conditions decrease the 
probability of a delisting and deregistration (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2012). 
According to Karolyi (2012), larger firms seeking “bonding” benefits from a U.S. 
listing continue to pursue a U.S. exchange listing; although the costs of a U.S. listing 
have increased, the benefits of “bonding” continued to outweigh the costs of compliance 
with the SEC regulations. 
 
3. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND DATA 
 
Our dataset consists of the universe of U.S. listed foreign firms on NYSE and 
NASDAQ over the period 2000 to 2012. We focus on U.S. exchange markets (NYSE 
and NASDAQ) to ensure better data availability and more uniform listing requirements. 
We include all firms that were already cross-listed and those that decided to cross-delist 
from U.S. exchanges markets10, and terminate SEC registration over 2000-2012. We 
also include new listings that occurred during the same period. Our sample period starts 
in 2000 because information about foreign firms registered and reporting with the SEC 
is not available in 1995 and in 1999. However, as our analysis requires the use of lagged 
variables, and to avoid reducing our sample period, we collect data prior to 2000 for all 
foreign firms included in our sample. Foreign firms that move from one major exchange 
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 We only include in our sample Level-2 and Level-3 ADRs. 
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to another are not treated as delists, whereas firms that move to the Over the Counter 
(OTC) market, OTCBB, or to the “Pink Sheets” are treated as delists.  
We obtained a list of all foreign firms with equity shares registered and reporting 
with the SEC from the SEC’s website11. That information was complemented and cross-
checked with data obtained from other sources (namely, the list of ADRs provided by 
the depositary banks and the exchanges or OTC markets’ websites). In fact, most 
foreign firms traded in the U.S. issue ADRs managed by a U.S. depositary banks such 
as the Bank of New York and Citibank. However, because not all foreign issuers with 
U.S. traded equity securities use ADR programs (Canadian and Israeli firms, for 
example, are able to list their securities directly on U.S. exchanges), we also collected 
data directly from the NYSE, NASDAQ, OTCBB and OTC Markets Portal.  
We then matched cross-listings with Datastream/ Worldscope database to collect 
market variables and accounting data12. Mergers and acquisitions data are from the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. Detailed information about all variables, 
including firm-, industry-, and country-level variables, is provided in Appendix A.  
To identify and understand the cross-delisting and deregistration reasons, we used 
SEC’s database, namely EDGAR’s13 archive, and searched for all cross-delisting and 
deregistration announcements, and also for all Form 15’s filed between 2000 and 2012.  
We exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC 
codes between 4900 and 4949) because their accounting values are largely dependent on 
statutory rules. We also exclude firms with total assets lower than $10 million to make 
firms more comparable across countries (e.g., Loureiro and Taboada (2015)), and for 
firms that are domiciled in tax off-shores14, we find their “true” country of origin, i.e., 
the management headquarters. Furthermore, we exclude observations with missing 
information on total assets, total sales, market capitalization, book value of equity and 
debt. Also, we require that firms have, at least, two years of observations. Thus, new 
listings in 2012 were dropped from the final sample. We winsorize the continuous 
variables (excluding the country-level variables) at both the bottom and top one percent 
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 http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
12
 Missing data from the primary databases was complemented with hand-collected data from stock exchanges, depositary banks, 
SEC and cross-listed firms’ websites. 
13
 Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system  (EDGAR’s) provided by the SEC 
14
 We exclude all firms domiciled and managed in tax off-shores (e.g., Cayman Islands). 
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tails to limit the effect of outliers. All variables expressed in U.S. dollars are Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) adjusted considering 2000 prices. 
After the sample screening, we end up with 9,092 firm-year observations that 
correspond to 1,147 firms, 583 of which have cross-delisted during the 2000-2012 
period. 
 
3.1 Reasons of cross-delisting and deregistration 
 
Although being different processes, cross-delisting is a first step prior to 
deregistration process. The time gap between delisting and deregistration is mainly due 
to administrative reasons. For example, an ADR program will be closed within four or 
five months after the written notice of termination (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2012). 
However, the motivations are basically the same. Hence, prior research differentiates 
cross-delisting and deregistration between involuntary and voluntary. Involuntary cross-
delisting or deregistration is due to reasons such as bankruptcy and disqualification to 
continue listed on U.S. exchange markets15. Foreign firms, like U.S.-based firms, can be 
suspended and deregistered by the SEC for rule violations. In contrast, voluntary 
delisting or deregistration can occur if firms meet the requirements imposed by SEC16 to 
delist and terminate registration. After the passage of Rule 12h-6 of March 21, 2007, it 
became easier for those firms to deregister and managers usually point out several 
reasons why they decided to leave U.S. exchange markets. After analyzing those 
announcements17 of firms that voluntarily cross-delisted and deregistered from U.S. 
exchange markets, we can summarize the reasons as follows: i) the significant costs, 
both direct and indirect, of preparing and filing the reports and forms that companies are 
required to; ii) the overall cost of a U.S. listing has increased substantially after SOX; 
iii) the costs of an ADR program outweigh the benefits due to the continued 
globalization of the capital markets; iv) the relatively small proportion of trading that 
takes place in the form of ADRs; v) the NYSE-Euronext markets’ integration; vi) the 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that makes compliance 
with GAAP redundant; vii) the reduced number of common shareholders of record; viii) 
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 See footnote 4. 
16
 SEC rules for deregistration process are described in footnotes 6 and 9. 
17
 We obtained the press release of delisting announcements for the most part of firms included in our dataset from the SEC’s 
website. 
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the volatile economic conditions that have affected the firms’ value in the last decade; 
ix) the increased sophistication and transparency of the capital markets worldwide is a 
substitute for the greater degree of shareholder protection offered by U.S. stock markets.  
Taken together, all these reasons imply that being cross-listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange is not reasonable if costs outweigh the benefits of doing it. 
 
In this context, firstly and according to Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2012), we 
classify delisting and deregistration in three main groups: 1) involuntary, 2) as result of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities, 3) and voluntary. Involuntary delistings 
correspond to those foreign firms that went bankrupt and were disqualified by NYSE or 
NASDAQ to maintain their listing or did not meet SEC registration requirements. 
M&As are considered as a single type independent from the strategy that originated 
those activities and in some analysis are included in the voluntary group. The voluntary 
group corresponds to those companies that made the decision to cross-delisted, and then 
to deregister. These firms were eligible under the SEC rules to deregister (see footnotes 
6 and 9). Foreign firms that voluntarily cross-delisted fit into the following three 
categories: 1) firms that cross-delisted before March 21, 2007, and deregister under 
Rule 12g-418; 2) firms that cross-delisted after March 21, 2007, and deregister under 
Rule 12h-6; 3) “other reasons” includes firms that changed its headquarters to U.S.19, 
went private or moved to OTCBB or to another OTC market. All reasons for delisting 
and deregistration are summarized in Appendix B and the groups of cross-delisted firms 
used in descriptive and empirical analysis are summarized in Appendix C.  
 
Table 1 describes, by country, industry and year our final sample. The sample of 
cross-delisted firms is segmented by the reason of delisting. Panel A of Table 1 reports 
a total of 583 cross-delisted firms, 555 of which deregister over 2000-2012, what 
indicates that most of the cross-delisted firms effectively terminate their registration 
with the SEC. At the end of 2012, there were about 564 cross-listed firms. By cross-
listed firms we mean foreign firms that do not delist over the course of our study and we 
will refer to them simply as cross-listed (in opposition to cross-delisted firms).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                           
18
 Rule 12g-4 is prior to Rule 12h-6 concerning deregistration process.  
19
 These foreign firms are removed from the sample after delisting. 
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As observed in Panel A of Table 1, about 204 firms were removed by U.S. stock 
markets (7 of which declared bankruptcy), 131 delists result from M&As processes, 106 
firms cross-delisted voluntarily before the passage of Rule 12h-6 of 2007, whereas 109 
firms cross-delisted after the Rule 12h-6 (after March, 2007), and 33 delisted due to 
“other reasons” already mentioned. The final sample includes 42 countries, 19 of which 
are considered emerging markets20. The number of delisted firms from Common Law21 
countries is 360 (61.8%) and the number of cross-listed firms from those countries is 
291 (51.6%), although Canada alone counts 194 delistings and 159 cross-listed firms in 
2012. Civil Law countries exhibit 125 (21.4%) cross-delisted firms and 113 (20.0%) 
cross-listings in 2012. Regarding German and Scandinavian Law countries, we identify 
98 (16.8%) cross-delistings and 160 (28.4%) cross-listed firms in 2012. In sum, even 
after removing Canada from the list of Common Law countries, those countries 
represent the highest number of delistings (42.7%), followed by Civil Law countries 
(32.1%). 
 
Panel B of Table 1 reports, by industry, the number of cross-delisted, deregistered, 
and cross-listed firms included in our sample. We assign firms to industries using the 
classification of Fama and French (1997) of 48 industry portfolios. This industry 
classification scheme is based on the four-digit SIC code available on Datastream/ 
Worlscope. For brevity reasons of presentation, we aggregate industries according to 
Massachusetts Department of Workforce Development22. Altogether, Mining, 
Communication, High Tech Manufacturing23 (level I), and Services are the most 
dynamic activity sectors, representing 63.3% of cross-listed and 62.8% of cross-delisted 
firms over 2000-2012.  
Panel C of Table 1 describes the final sample by year. It is important to stress that 
2007 is the record year with the highest number of firms leaving the U.S. exchanges; 
about 59 foreign firms voluntarily cross-delisted and 61 firms deregistered.  
                                                           
20
 This classification is in accordance with the Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database for the year of 2000 and was 
collected from Standard & Poor’s, Emerging Markets Factbook, 2001. 
21
 We follow La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) and assign firms according to the legal origin of domestic markets. 
22
 We follow the Massachusetts Department of Workforce Development, Division of Career Services, Economic Analysis Office, 
July 2007. 
23
 High Tech Manufacturing (Level I) includes: Printing and Publishing; Healthcare; Medical Equipment; Pharmaceutical Products; 
Aircraft; Computers; Electronic Equipment; Measuring and Control Equipment. Communication is classified in the group of High 
Tech Manufacturing (level I), but in this analysis is considered alone. 
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3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Cross-delisting creates a quasi-experiment where we can identify a treatment group 
of firms that cross-delist at some point in time over 2000-2012, and a control group 
composed by cross-listed firms. Thus, Table 2 compares characteristics of both 
treatment and control groups. The passage of the Rule 12h-6 of 2007 imposes a regime 
shift that is important to explore (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2010). Thus, our sample is 
divided in two subsets according two different periods of time. To differentiate the 
period before and after the passage of the Rule 12h-6, the first subset covers the 2000-
2006 years (Panel A) and the second covers the 2007-2012 years (Panel B). We follow 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2010) and measure the characteristics of cross-delisted firms 
in the year before delisting takes place.   
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that treatment (cross-delisted) firms are smaller in size 
(Total Assets), have fewer growth opportunities (Q and Sales Growth), smaller 
profitability (ROA), appear to be from more developed countries (Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita) and with stronger private enforcement of investor rights 
(Anti-Self-Dealing Index). Over the same period, involuntary group of cross-delisted 
firms is revealed to be smaller in many dimensions when comparing with the cross-
listed firms and the other groups of treatment firms. However, involuntary cross-
delisted firms are originated, on average, from countries with higher GDP per capita, 
and with stronger investor protection rules (Anti-Self-Dealing Index). On the side of 
voluntary firms, they are smaller (Total Assets), but more levered (Leverage) than listed 
firms, display smaller growth opportunities (Q and Sales Growth), are less profitable 
(ROA) and are originated, on average, from countries with higher GDP per capita, but 
with investor protection regimes similar to cross-listed firms. 
 
Taken together the results of Panel B of Table 2, the characteristics of cross-delisted 
firms have changed over the time, particularly the characteristics of voluntary group of 
treatment firms. Voluntary group overcome the control group of cross-listed firms in 
terms of Total Assets across the 2007-2012 period. However, voluntary treatment firms 
have a significant lower market capitalization than listed and seem to have lower growth 
opportunities (regarding Sales Growth). It is also interesting to notice that both groups 
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of firms, treatment and control, present lower indicators of growth opportunities (Q and 
Sales Growth) in the post-Rule 12h-6, which may be related somehow with the 
economic slowdown caused, mainly, by the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
Some previous research studied the determinants of delisting (e.g., Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand (2012)), but little is known about the economic consequences of cross-
delisting. 
In this study, we contribute to the literature by providing evidence on the long-term 
performance of firms post-cross-delisting. First, we examine the post-operating 
performance of cross-delisted firms by comparing with a control group of matched 
cross-listed firms. Second, we analyze the long-run stock returns performance of cross-
delisted firms relative to the same control group.  
 
4.1 Post-Cross-Delisting Operating Performance 
 
To measure operating performance, we use accounting-based variables commonly 
used in prior literature, as: i) Sales Growth to capture growth opportunities; ii) Fixed 
Assets Ratio (fixed assets to total assets) to measure changes in fixed investments; iii) 
Turnover Ratio (total sales to total assets) as a proxy for operating efficiency; iv) and 
ROA and ROE as measures of profitability. This analysis of performance is conducted 
to identify significant differences between the treatment group of cross-delisted firms 
and a control group of cross-listed firms over a period of three years following the 
cross-delisting year. Therefore, we estimate the average effect of the treatment (i.e., the 
cross-delisting event) on firms’ operating performance in the post-delisting period. One 
problem that usually affects quasi-experimental studies is that individuals are not 
randomly assigned to treatment, meaning that firms with some type of characteristics 
may be more likely to cross-delist. If this is the case, our results may be affected by 
selection bias and endogeneity issues. To overcome this problem, we will use the 
propensity score matching (PSM) technique proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
Therefore, each individual of the treatment group will be matched to an individual of 
the control group with identical pre-treatment characteristics. This means that each 
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cross-delisted (treatment) firm will be matched with a cross-listed (control) firm with a 
similar propensity to cross-delist before treatment start (in the pre-treatment period). 
Thus, we perform PSM selecting the nearest neighbour24 with replacement. The nearest 
neighbour algorithm with replacement allows that a control (cross-listed) firm can be 
used more than once as a match. This technique can often decrease bias because control 
firms that look similar to many treatment firms can be used multiple times (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008). 
The first step of the PSM technique consists in estimating the probability of 
delisting using a probabilistic model. From this estimation we obtain, for each firm, the 
propensity scores that are used to match each treated firm with the closest non-treated 
firm. We estimate the propensity scores using the following probit model: 
 
(	
 = 1) = 
 + 
, +  +  +  + 
						               (1) 
 
where 	
 is a binary variable that takes one if a firm is exposed to the treatment, i.e., 
a firm that cross-delists at some point over 2000-2012, and zero otherwise. 
, is a set 
of control variables (covariates) that affect the delisting decision. All covariates are 
lagged one period because we want to match treatment and control firms prior to the 
cross-delisting event. The set of covariates used to estimate the propensity scores are 
supposed to affect both the cross-delisting decision and the operating performance. 
Hence, we need to identify the drivers that impact the firm performance of both 
treatment and control groups. Based on the previous literature (Marosi and Massoud 
(2008), Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2010), Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2012)), we select 
the following set of covariates25 
,: i) 
,, the logarithm of total assets that 
controls for the impact of firm size on cross-delisting decision; ii)  
,, a proxy for 
                                                           
24
 There are several algorithms to establish the matching process, which differ due to the different weighting regimes to evaluate the 
importance of each control for each treatment firm. In general, the choice for specific matching algorithms should be of minor 
importance and different algorithms should lead to similar results if the sample size is large enough (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
Therefore, we apply matching technique with nearest neighbor and caliper, which corresponds to a propensity score range. Applying 
caliper matching means that a control firm will be matched with a treatment firm that lies within the range. The proper caliper was 
computed following Wang et al. (2013), and corresponds to 0.2 of propensity score standard deviation.  
25
 These covariates ensure the quality of matching. The quality of matching is tested using the Likelihood-Ratio (LR) chi2 test, which 
tests the goodness-of-fit of the probit model used in the propensity score estimation; if the propensity score is the most suitable one, 
the coefficients of such specification should be zero or close to zero. In this case, the p-value of Likelihood-ratio test (described in 
Table 3) is 0.526. 
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growth opportunities, measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity scaled by the book value of total assets; iii) 
Financing Deficiti,t-1, a proxy for needs of external financing, is the sum of dividends, 
net investments and net changes in working capital minus internal cash flows, scaled by 
lagged total assets (see Frank and Goyal, 2003); !"#
, is the ratio of total debt 
to total assets and is motivated by earlier evidence (e.g., Healy and Palepu (1990)) 
showing that highly levered firms are more prone to make decisions (such as cross-
delisting) to preserve cash. We also include dummies to adjust the propensity score for 
country (), industry (), and year () effects. Table 3 reports the results. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 reports marginal effects from the estimation of the probit model represented 
in equation (1). All coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level, 
except Financing Deficiti,t-1 that is insignificant. Results suggest that smaller firms are 
more likely to delist (
,), as firms with lower growth opportunities ( 
,), and 
higher debt ratios (!"#
,).  
In the second step, we match each firm from the treatment group (cross-delisted 
firms) with a firm from the control group (firms that remained cross-listed), from the 
same country, industry and year and with the closest propensity score. We then analyze 
the average treatment effects by computing the relative changes in operating 
performance from year t-1 to t, t+1, t+2 and t+3. We report differences in means and in 
medians of changes in operating performance for the group of cross-delisted firms (All) 
and also for groups of involuntary and voluntary (before and after the passage of Rule 
12h-6). Table 4 shows the results.  
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
We observe in Table 4 insignificant differences between treatment and control 
firms, except for ∆Sales Growth and ∆ROA. Differences of ∆Sales Growth (which 
captures growth opportunities) are negative and significant in year t+3 (relative to t-1), 
which suggests that cross-delisted firms decreased their growth opportunities post-
cross-delisting compared to the control firms. Differences in means between treatment 
and control firms of changes in ROA show a significant increase from year one up three 
years after cross-delisting. These differences seem to be driven by voluntary group of 
firms that cross-delisted before the passage of the Rule 12h-6 in 2007 (“Pre-Rule”). In 
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fact, regarding the results for that group, differences in means and medians of ∆ROA are 
significant over time. Moreover, differences are only significant one year after the 
cross-delisting takes place and not before, which could suggest that the cost of a U.S. 
listing exceeds the benefit for that group of cross-delisted firms. Hence, cross-delisting 
“release” those firms from costs that affect ROA negatively. However, this performance 
measure is based on accounting data, which are vulnerable to distortion by managers 
because accounting principles might be (somehow) subjective (e.g., when to recognize 
revenues or costs). Previous evidence provided by Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) show 
that managers of cross-listed firms in U.S. stock exchanges are less prone to engage in 
earnings management than managers of a matched sample of purely domestic firms. 
Therefore, it is expected that strong regulatory enforcement and disclosure standards 
provided by a cross-listing in U.S. exchanges should reduce managers’ capacity to 
manipulate information. On the other side, managers of cross-delisted firms might be 
motivated to engage in earnings manipulation because these firms are no longer under 
the surveillance of the SEC (and other U.S. Institutions). 
In contrast, the voluntary group of firms that cross-delisted after Rule 12h-6 (“Post-
Rule”) reveals significant negative differences relative to the matched group of control 
firms. From t-1 to t+3, changes in Sales Growth display a significant negative 
difference in mean (median) of 10.34 percentage points (pp) (16.43pp), whereas 
∆Turnover Ratio also shows a significant negative difference of 6.75pp (3.89pp) in 
mean (median). There are no significant differences of changes in ROA, but ∆ROE is 
about 12.89pp (5.44pp) lower in mean (median) for the treatment firms three years 
following cross-delisting. Overall, our results suggest that firms that cross-delisted after 
Rule 12h-6 have less growth opportunities, are less efficient, and profitability (measured 
by ∆ROE) grows less than that of control firms; these effects persists up to three years 
following cross-delisting. Overall, we consider our last results consistent with the 
argument that firms cross-delist because they have less growth opportunities and this is 
persistent in the long run. 
Concerning the performance of involuntary group, we only observe significant 
differences in ∆Fixed Assets Ratio, which means that involuntary cross-delisted firms 
invest less in fixed assets (in proportion of total assets) than its cross-listed peers.  
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4.2 Long-term Returns Performance  
  
In addition to the previous analysis, we also investigate the long-run returns 
performance of cross-delisted firms. We analyze long-term performance using buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (BHARs), following the approach of Barber and Lyon (1997). 
The authors argue that BHARs are closer to the actual investment experience because 
investors usually invest in assets and hold them for a certain period of time. We 
estimate abnormal buy-and-hold returns as the difference between the buy-and-hold 
return of a treatment firm and the buy-and-hold return of a matched control firm. Thus, 
the counterfactual is what an investor would have earned if he had invested the same 
amount of cash over the same period of time in the control firm. Furthermore, previous 
research document that long-run return performance is very sensitive to the benchmark 
used to estimate abnormal buy-and-hold returns (e.g., Barber and Lyon26 (1997), 
Kothari and Warner (1997), Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999)), thus using a matching-firm 
approach instead of benchmark indices reduces significant bias.  
Following the literature (e.g., Loughran and Vijh (1997)), we match each treatment 
firm with a firm from the control group (cross-listed firms) from the same country, year, 
and industry that has the closest market value of equity and the closest book-to-market. 
To obtain the best match and generate single pairs of matched firms, we use the PSM 
procedure without replacement and select the nearest neighbour. Buy-and-hold returns 
are compounded using monthly returns over a period of one year as follows:    
 
$%&'
,( = )*1 + '
,+
(
,
−)*1 + E/'012345,6+
(
,
																											(2) 
 
where $%&'
, is buy-and-hold abnormal return for firm i. ∏ *1 + '
,+(,  is the 
monthly compounded return of a one-year buy-and-hold investment in the stocks of 
treatment firm i. ∏ *1 + E/'012345,6+(,  is the monthly compounded return of a one-
                                                           
26
 Barber and Lyon (1997) identify three main sources of biases in calculating abnormal buy-and-hold returns: 1) “new listing bias”, 
which arises since new listings tend to underperform benchmark indices, thus adding new firms to the index results in a positive bias 
to abnormal returns; 2) “rebalancing bias”, which occurs because benchmark indices are periodically rebalanced whereas treatment 
firms are not, hence leading to a negative bias; 3) abnormal buy-and-hold returns are positively skewed and therefore the use of 
statistical t-test drives to incorrect inferences. Hence, these sources of bias can be reduced if matched firms are used instead of 
benchmark indexes. 
19 
 
year buy-and-hold investment in the stocks of the corresponding matched (control) firm. 
Table 5 reports the results.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the mean and the median of buy-and-hold returns for 
matched pairs of treatment and control firms. Differences in means and medians are 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. On average, investors that hold the 
investment for one year in treatment firms earn 7 percentage points less than what they 
would have earned if they had invested in the control firms.  
 
Panel B of Table 5 provides the mean and the median of abnormal buy-and-hold 
returns for treatment firms in the pre- and in the post-cross-delisting period. We observe 
that the mean and median abnormal buy-and hold return are negative both in the pre- 
and in the post-cross-delisting period, being more negative in the post-delisting period. 
Moreover, the difference between pre- and post-cross-delisting is, on average, 
significant.  
 
In addition to the univariate analysis, we also examine the pre- and the post-cross-
delisting abnormal buy-and-hold return by estimating equation (3). 
 
$%&'
,	 = 
 + 9:;<=	
, +  +  +  + 
						                      (3) 
 
where $%&'
, is buy-and-hold abnormal return from equation (2). :;<=	
, is an 
indicator variable equal to one if treatment firm i is delisted in year t, and zero 
otherwise. We also include dummies to control for country,	, industry, , and year, 
. Table 6 shows the results. 
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
As we observe in Table 6, the coefficient 9 is negative and statistically significant 
in all models. In model (1) we cluster standard errors at firm- and year-level, and in 
model (2) standard errors are clustered at country- and year-level. In model (3) we 
estimate equation (3) using the Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) procedure. As an example, 
in model (1) the abnormal buy-and-hold return declines 20.48 percentage points relative 
to the pre-delisting period. This result suggests that cross-delisted firms underperform 
their matching pairs, especially in the post-delisting period. 
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5. MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study we examine the post-operating performance and the long-run stock 
returns performance of cross-delisted firms from U.S. stock markets. Using a sample of 
foreign firms listed and delisted on U.S. exchange markets over 2000-2012, we end up 
with 583 cross-delisted firms used as a treatment sample and 564 cross-listed firms used 
as a control sample. 
Our results provide evidence that cross-delisted firms have less growth opportunities 
than a matched group of cross-listed firms in the long run. Moreover, we document a 
significant decline in operating performance for the voluntary group of firms that 
delisted after the passage of Rule 12h-6 in 2007. Thus, that group of voluntary 
delistings (after Rule 12h-6) seems to have lower growth opportunities in the long run 
than a matched group of cross-listed firms, which is consistent with the evidence 
provided by Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, (2010). Furthermore, cross-delisted firms after 
the Rule seem to be less efficient and less profitable than their cross-listed counterparts. 
However, results for the group of firms that cross-delisted before the passage of the 
Rule 12h-6 are different. Our findings suggest that the cost of a U.S. listing affect 
negatively those cross-delisted firms’ profitability in the pre-cross-delisting period; one 
year after delisting, cross-delisted firms exhibit higher profitability growth rates than 
comparable cross-listed firms and this result persists until three years after delisting. 
This evidence supports the argument that if a U.S. listing is no longer valuable so the 
costs outweigh the benefits. 
In addition, we also provide evidence of a negative abnormal buy-and-hold return, 
in the pre- and post-cross-delisting period, for the treatment group of cross-delisted 
firms. Results from multivariate analysis show that the abnormal buy-and-hold return 
declines 20.48 percentage points in the post-cross-delisting. This last evidence suggests 
that cross-delisted firms underperform their matched pairs, mainly in the post-delisting 
period. 
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APPENDIX A – Definitions and Sources of the variables 
VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE 
Firm-level   
Book-to-Market The book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity. 
Worldscope 
and 
Datastream 
Buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns 
(BHARs) 
Monthly compounded return of a one-year buy-and-hold 
investment in the stocks of treatment firms less monthly 
compounded return of a one-year buy-and-hold investment 
in the stocks of the corresponding matched firms. 
Datastream 
Delist Indicator variable that takes one if a treatment firm delisted 
in a given year over 2000-2012, and zero otherwise. 
SEC website, 
Datastream 
and Citibank 
Financing Deficit  Numerator: the sum of cash dividends, net investments, and 
net changes in working capital, less internal cash flows (net 
income, depreciation and amortization expenses, and 
deferred taxes). Denominator: lagged total assets (see Frank 
and Goyal, 2003). Deferred taxes are set to zero when they 
are missing. 
Worldscope 
Fixed Assets Ratio Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) divided by total assets. Worldscope 
Leverage  Total debt (short-term plus long-term debt) divided by total 
assets. 
Worldscope 
Market Capitalization  Market price (year-end) multiplied by the number of 
common shares outstanding, denominated in U.S. dollars 
and converted at fiscal year-end exchange rates. 
Datastream 
Market value of 
equity 
Logarithm of the market value of equity. Datastream 
Return on Assets  
(ROA) 
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total 
assets. 
Worldscope 
Return on Equity  
(ROE) 
Net income after preferred dividends divided by book value 
of equity. 
Worldscope 
Sales Growth  Percentage change in sales over a given period. Worldscope 
SIZE Logarithm of total assets. Worldscope 
(Tobin's) Q Numerator: market value of equity plus book value of assets 
minus book value of equity. Denominator: book value of 
assets. 
Worldscope 
 
Total Assets Total Assets in U.S. dollars, converted at fiscal year-end 
exchange rates.  
Worldscope 
Treat Binary variable that takes one if a firm cross-delists at some 
point over 2000-2012, i.e., if a firm is included in the 
treatment group, and zero otherwise. 
SEC website, 
Datastream 
and Citibank 
Turnover Ratio Total sales divided by total assets. Worldscope 
Industry-Level   
INDUSTRY Classification scheme proposed by Fama and French (1997), 
based on 48 Industry Portfolios. 
Fama and 
French 
(1997) 
SIC CODE Four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. Datastream 
Country-Level   
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VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE 
Anti-Self–Dealing 
Index  
Index that measures shareholder’s rights. This index ranges 
between 0 and 0.66. 
Djankov et 
al. (2008) 
GDP per Capita 
(GDP/PC) 
Logarithm of GDP per capita. Worldbank 
Market Capitalization 
to GDP (%) 
Market capitalization divided by Gross domestic product 
(GDP), expressed in percentage. 
Worldbank 
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APPENDIX 1.B – Reasons for cross-delisting and deregistration 
CATEGORY REASON 
INVOLUNTARY 
 
Bankruptcy    Firms that declared bankruptcy. 
Revoked by SEC    Registration was revoked by SEC for not fill the imposed requirements. 
Removed by NYSE    Listing removed by NYSE for not meet the imposed requirements. 
Removed by 
NASDAQ 
   Listing removed by NASDAQ for not meet the imposed requirements. 
 
MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS 
 
M&A    Firms delisted following a merger or acquisition process. 
 
VOLUNTARY 
 
Pre-Rule 12h-6    Firms delisted and then deregistered before the passage of the Rule 12h-6 
(deregistration under the Rule 12g-4).  
Post-Rule 12h-6    Firms delisted and then deregistered under the Rule 12h-6 (became effective 
on March 21, 2007). 
Changed its 
headquarters to U.S. 
   Firms that moved their headquarters to U.S. and are no longer considered as 
foreign. 
Going private    Firms that went private. 
Moved to OTCBB    Firms that delisted from U.S. exchange markets and moved to OTCBB. 
Moved to OTC    Firms that delisted from U.S. exchange markets and moved to another OTC. 
 
APPENDIX 1.C – Groups of Cross-delisted firms 
GROUP REASON 
INVOLUNTARY  
Involuntary    Firms that declared bankruptcy or whose listings were removed by U.S. markets - 
NYSE or NASDAQ - for not meet the imposed requirements.  
 
MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS 
 
M&A    Firms delisted following a merger or acquisition process. 
 
VOLUNTARY 
 
Pre-Rule 12h-6    Firms delisted before the passage of the Rule 12h-6 (deregistration under the Rule 
12g-4).  
Post-Rule 12h-6    Firms delisted under the Rule 12h-6 (became effective on March 21, 2007). 
Other reasons    Firms that moved their headquarters to U.S., went private or moved to OTCBB or 
to another OTC. 
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TABLE 1: Sample Description 
Table 1 describes the sample by country of origin, industry and year over 2000-2012, excluding financial firms (SIC Code 6000-6999) and strictly regulated firms (SIC Code 
4900-4949). Each panel reports the number of firms that cross-delisted and that deregistered, and also the number of cross-listed (control) firms included in the sample. Cross-
delisted firms are divided by the reason of delisting according to the segmentation described in Appendix C. Involuntary group of cross-delisted firms comprises firms that were 
removed by U.S. markets (7 of which declared bankruptcy). M&A group of cross-delisted firms includes mergers and acquisitions. Voluntary group of cross-delisted includes 
firms that delisted before and after the passage of the Rule 12h-6 in 2007. “Other” includes other reasons as firms that moved their headquarters to U.S., went private or moved to 
OTC. Deregistered group reports the number of firms that deregistered after delisting by involuntary, M&A and voluntary reasons. Reasons of cross-delisting and deregistration 
are described in Appendix B. Panel A describes by country of origin the number of firms that cross-delisted and that deregistered, and the number of cross-listed firms included in 
the sample. Panel B describes by industry the number of firms that cross-delisted and that deregistered, and the number of cross-listed firms. We assign firms to industries using 
the classification scheme of Fama and French (1997) of 48 industry portfolios. We then aggregate industries according to Massachusetts Department of Workforce Development 
(document of 2007). Industry (low) includes: Food Products; Candy and Soda; Beverages; Tobacco; Textiles. Industry (med) includes: Consumer Goods; Apparel; Steel; Paper 
Supplies; Other Fabricated Products. High Tech Manufacturing (Level I) includes: Printing and Publishing; Healthcare; Medical Equipment; Pharmaceutical Products; Aircraft; 
Computers; Electronic Equipment; Measuring and Control Equipment. Communication is classified as High Tech Manufacturing level I but is considered alone. High Tech 
Manufacturing (Level II) includes: Chemicals; Rubber and Plastic Products; Machinery. Oil is classified as High Tech level Manufacturing II but is considered alone. High Tech 
Manufacturing (Level III) includes: Electrical Equipment; Automobiles and Trucks. Coal is classified as High Tech Manufacturing level III but is considered in the mining group. 
Panel C describes by year the number of firms that cross-delisted and that deregistered, and also the number of firm-year observations of cross-listed firms included in the sample 
over 2000-2012. *Denotes a country designated as an emerging market by Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database. 
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Panel A – Sample Description by Country 
 
Cross-Delisted 
 
Deregistered 
 
Control 
Involuntary M&A 
Voluntary 
Total  Involuntary M&A Voluntary Total  Cross-listed 
  
Pre-Rule 
12h-6 
Post-Rule 
12h-6 Other   
Argentina* 1 1 0 0 0 2 
 
1 1 0 2 
 
5 
Australia 6 2 3 5 3 19 
 
3 2 11 16 
 
7 
Austria 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
0 0 1 1 
 
0 
Belgium 1 0 0 1 0 2 
 
1 0 1 2 
 
2 
Brazil* 8 4 0 0 1 13 
 
8 4 1 13 
 
17 
Canada 91 55 19 10 19 194 
 
86 55 39 180 
 
159 
Chile* 1 2 2 3 1 9 
 
1 2 6 9 
 
5 
China* 18 1 1 2 1 23 
 
17 1 4 22 
 
108 
Colombia* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
1 
Denmark 0 0 1 1 0 2 
 
0 0 2 2 
 
2 
Finland 0 2 1 3 0 6 
 
0 2 4 6 
 
1 
France 2 6 5 10 0 23 
 
2 6 15 23 
 
9 
Germany 3 1 5 10 1 20 
 
3 1 16 20 
 
5 
Greece* 2 2 1 1 0 6 
 
1 2 2 5 
 
24 
Hong Kong 10 1 2 6 1 20 
 
9 1 8 18 
 
18 
Hungary* 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
0 0 1 1 
 
0 
India* 2 0 0 2 0 4 
 
2 0 2 4 
 
9 
Indonesia* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
2 
Ireland 4 2 3 0 0 9 
 
4 2 3 9 
 
8 
Israel 23 3 7 4 1 38 
 
18 3 12 33 
 
53 
Italy 0 0 3 3 0 6 
 
0 0 6 6 
 
5 
Japan 1 0 3 4 1 9 
 
1 0 8 9 
 
15 
Korea* 1 3 0 3 0 7 
 
1 3 3 7 
 
5 
Luxembourg 1 2 3 2 0 8 
 
1 2 5 8 
 
5 
Mexico* 7 2 6 1 0 16 
 
7 2 7 16 
 
17 
Netherlands 4 6 9 7 0 26 
 
3 6 16 25 
 
11 
New Zealand 0 1 2 0 0 3 
 
0 1 2 3 
 
1 
Norway 0 3 0 3 1 7 
 
0 3 4 7 
 
8 
Peru* 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
0 0 1 1 
 
1 
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Panel A – Sample Description by Country 
 
Cross-Delisted 
 
Deregistered 
 
Control 
Involuntary M&A 
Voluntary 
Total  Involuntary M&A Voluntary Total  Cross-listed 
  
Pre-Rule 
12h-6 
Post-Rule 
12h-6 Other   
Philippines* 1 0 0 0 0 1 
 
1 0 0 1 
 
1 
Poland* 0 0 1 0 0 1 
 
0 0 1 1 
 
0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
1 
Russia* 0 2 1 1 0 4 
 
0 2 2 4 
 
3 
Singapore 1 1 0 2 0 4 
 
1 1 2 4 
 
2 
South Africa* 1 0 0 2 0 3 
 
1 0 2 3 
 
6 
Spain 0 3 0 1 0 4 
 
0 3 1 4 
 
3 
Sweden 0 3 8 1 1 13 
 
0 3 9 12 
 
1 
Switzerland 1 1 1 4 0 7 
 
1 1 5 7 
 
5 
Taiwan* 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
0 0 1 1 
 
10 
Turkey* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
1 
United Kingdom 13 21 18 13 1 66 
 
13 21 32 66 
 
28 
Venezuela* 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 
1 1 2 4 
 
0 
 Total 204 131 106 109 33 583   187 131 237 555 
 
564 
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Panel B – Sample Description by Industry 
Cross-Delisted 
 
Deregistered 
 
Control 
Involuntary M&A 
Voluntary 
Total  Involuntary M&A Voluntary Total  Cross-listed 
  
Pre-Rule 
12h-6 
Post-Rule 
12h-6 Other   
Agriculture 0 2 1 1 0 4 
 
0 2 2 4 
 
4 
Mining 26 9 3 3 3 44 
 
25 9 7 41 
 
84 
Construction 4 1 0 4 0 9 
 
4 1 4 9 
 
10 
Transportation 5 9 2 6 1 23 
 
4 9 9 22 
 
53 
Oil 14 16 4 4 3 41 
 
13 16 11 40 
 
37 
Communication 20 16 23 23 3 85 
 
20 16 48 84 
 
47 
Manufacturing (low) 3 4 5 2 2 16 
 
3 4 9 16 
 
15 
Manufacturing (med) 15 7 11 10 2 45 
 
15 7 22 44 
 
32 
Manufacturing (Level I) 51 25 20 23 12 131 
 
45 25 50 120 
 
131 
Manufacturing (Level II) 10 6 6 8 0 30 
 
9 6 14 29 
 
20 
Manufacturing (Level III) 5 5 6 5 0 21 
 
2 5 11 18 
 
14 
Services 39 27 20 15 5 106 
 
35 27 38 100 
 
95 
Wholesale 6 2 2 3 1 14 
 
6 2 6 14 
 
10 
Retail 5 2 2 2 1 12 
 
5 2 5 12 
 
10 
Other 1 0 1 0 0 2 
 
1 0 1 2 
 
2 
 Total 204 131 106 109 33 583   187 131 237 555   564 
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Panel C – Sample Description by Year 
 
Cross-Delisted 
 
Deregistered 
 
Control 
Involuntary M&A 
Voluntary 
Total  Involuntary M&A Voluntary Total  Cross-listed 
  
Pre-Rule  
12h-6 
Post-Rule 
12h-6 Other   
2000 3 8 0 2 13 3 8 2 13 232 
2001 8 20 2 5 35 8 20 7 35 243 
2002 13 21 15 5 54 13 21 19 53 265 
2003 3 16 21 4 44 3 16 23 42 296 
2004 3 10 18 3 34 2 10 20 32 325 
2005 6 25 26 1 58 6 25 26 57 352 
2006 19 13 24 1 57 19 13 24 56 387 
2007 26 6 59 1 92 24 6 61 91 389 
2008 28 0 15 5 48 27 0 18 45 399 
2009 26 3 15 2 46 25 3 15 43 405 
2010 20 3 9 1 33 17 3 9 29 479 
2011 22 5 6 2 35 18 5 7 30 564 
2012 27 1 5 1 34 22 1 6 29 564 
Total 204 131 106 109 33 583   187 131 237 555   4900  
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TABLE 2: Summary Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the control group of cross-listed firms and for the treatment group of firms, which includes all firms in our sample that have cross-
delisted at some point in time between 2000 and 2012. The treatment group is described as “All” and segmented by involuntary and voluntary before (“Pre-Rule”) and after 
(“Post-Rule”) the passage of the Rule 12h-6. Panel A covers the 2000-2006 years before the passage of the Rule 12h-6, and Panel B covers the 2007-2012 years after the passage 
of the Rule 12h-6. Descriptive statistics are measured in the year before cross-delisting takes place. Total assets are in US$ million, reflecting 2000 prices. Market capitalization 
is in US$ million, reflecting 2000 prices, and is calculated as the year-end market price multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding. Fixed Assets Ratio is property, 
plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. Turnover Ratio is total sales scaled by total assets. Q is measured as the market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book 
value of equity scaled by the book value of assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over a one-year period. ROA is earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total 
assets. ROE is net income after preferred dividends scaled by book value of equity. Financing deficit is the sum of dividends, net investments and net changes in working capital 
minus internal cash flows, scaled by lagged total assets (see Frank and Goyal, 2003). Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Book-to-Market is the book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity. Anti-Self-Dealing Index measures shareholder’s rights and ranges between 0 and 0.66 (see Djankov et al., 2008). GDP per capita is the 
logarithm of GDP per capita. Market Cap/GDP is market capitalization divided by GDP, and expressed in percentage. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Means, medians 
and the number of observations (“N”) are reported for each variable. Differences in means are tested using t-statistic test (not reported) and differences in medians are tested using 
Wilcoxon rank sum test (not reported). ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Panel A - Descriptive Statistics 2000-2006 
 
Control 
 
Treatment 
     
All   Involuntary   Voluntary: Pre-Rule 
 
Mean Median N   Mean Median N   Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Total Assets 10, 200.00 1,732.93 2100 
 
2,385.25 *** 441.96 *** 295 
 
1,094.18 *** 306.85 *** 55 
 
3,209.70 *** 509.68 *** 106 
Market Capitalization 11,300.00 1,763.52 2100 
 
2,033.15 *** 335.51 *** 295 
 
1,329.56 *** 246.28 *** 55 
 
2,685.84 *** 298.8 *** 106 
Fixed Assets 0.38 0.35 2100 
 
0.35 * 0.29 ** 295 
 
0.39 
 
0.36 
 
55 
 
0.32 ** 0.28 ** 106 
Turnover  0.67 0.60 2100 
 
0.71 
 
0.63 
 
295 
 
0.65 
 
0.61 
 
55 
 
0.74 * 0.69 * 106 
Q 2.18 1.56 2100 
 
1.81 *** 1.34 *** 295 
 
2.11 
 
1.54 
 
55 
 
1.74 *** 1.32 *** 106 
Sales Growth 0.12 0.09 2100 
 
0.08 
 
0.08 
 
295 
 
0.04 
 
0.08 
 
55 
 
0.02 ** 0.04 *** 106 
ROA 0.06 0.08 2100 
 
-0.05 *** 0.01 *** 295 
 
-0.04 *** 0.00 *** 55 
 
-0.08 *** 0.02 *** 106 
ROE 0.06 0.10 2100 
 
-0.12 *** 0.02 *** 295 
 
-0.08 ** 0.02 *** 55 
 
-0.17 *** 0.01 *** 106 
Financing Deficit 0.05 0.00 2100 
 
0.09 ** 0.01 * 295 
 
0.10 * 0.03 
 
55 
 
0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
106 
Leverage 0.23 0.21 2100 
 
0.25 ** 0.21 
 
295 
 
0.28 * 0.26 * 55 
 
0.24 
 
0.20 
 
106 
Book-to-Market 0.60 0.44 2100 
 
0.80 *** 0.57 *** 295 
 
0.82 * 0.51 
 
55 
 
0.77 ** 0.58 *** 106 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index 0.52 0.66 2100 
 
0.55 *** 0.66 *** 295 
 
0.59 *** 0.66 *** 55 
 
0.51 
 
0.66 
 
106 
GDP per capita 9.58 10.02 2100 
 
9.96 *** 10.10 *** 295 
 
9.83 ** 10.07 
 
55 
 
10.03 *** 10.20 *** 106 
Market Cap/GDP (%) 98.21 89.43 2100  102.31   103.24 *** 295   105.66   101.16 * 55   94.98   92.86   106 
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Panel B – Descriptive Statistics 2007-2012 
 
Control 
 
Treatment  
     
All   Involuntary   Voluntary: Post-Rule 
 
Mean Median N  Mean Median N   Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Total Assets 10, 200.00 945.84 2800 
 
5,731.80 *** 627.91 *** 288 
 
2,399.62 *** 262.58 *** 149 
 
10,800.00 
 
2,569.89 *** 109 
Market Capitalization 9,587.73 882.39 2800 
 
3,704.61 *** 630.49 *** 288 
 
1,795.03 *** 211.58 *** 149 
 
6,517.27 *** 1,906.10 ** 109 
Fixed Assets 0.36 0.31 2800 
 
0.31 *** 0.24 *** 288 
 
0.31 ** 0.24 ** 149 
 
0.30 *** 0.25 * 109 
Turnover  0.62 0.57 2800 
 
0.69 ** 0.66 *** 288 
 
0.66 
 
0.64 
 
149 
 
0.73 ** 0.68 *** 109 
Q 1.93 1.44 2800 
 
1.81 
 
1.37 
 
288 
 
1.76 * 1.28 * 149 
 
1.87 
 
1.45 
 
109 
Sales Growth 0.09 0.09 2800 
 
0.04 * 0.01 *** 288 
 
0.08 
 
0.06 * 149 
 
-0.04 *** -0.03 *** 109 
ROA 0.04 0.06 2800 
 
-0.01 *** 0.04 *** 288 
 
-0.02 *** 0.03 *** 149 
 
0.02 
 
0.06 
 
109 
ROE 0.04 0.08 2800 
 
-0.02 * 0.06 ** 288 
 
-0.07 ** 0.03 *** 149 
 
0.09 
 
0.10 
 
109 
Financing Deficit 0.07 0.01 2800 
 
0.08 
 
0.03 * 288 
 
0.10 
 
0.04 * 149 
 
0.05 
 
0.02 
 
109 
Leverage 0.20 0.16 2800 
 
0.24 *** 0.23 *** 288 
 
0.21 
 
0.15 
 
149 
 
0.27 *** 0.28 *** 109 
Book-to-Market 0.76 0.53 2800 
 
0.73 
 
0.52 
 
288 
 
0.85 
 
0.62 
 
149 
 
0.56 *** 0.43 ** 109 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index  0.52 0.66 2800 
 
0.53 
 
0.66 
 
288 
 
0.57 *** 0.66 *** 149 
 
0.48 *** 0.38 *** 109 
GDP per capita 9.76 10.15 2800 
 
10.02 *** 10.42 *** 288 
 
9.93 ** 10.42 * 149 
 
10.10 *** 10.37 *** 109 
Market Cap/GDP (%) 102.76 92.14 2800  124.80 *** 107.66 *** 288   123.83 ** 107.31 *** 149   130.00 *** 107.66 *** 109 
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TABLE 3: The Propensity Score Estimation 
Table 3 provides the marginal effects for the probit model set in equation (1). 	
  is a binary variable 
that takes one if a firm is exposed to the treatment (i.e., cross-delisting), and zero otherwise. Covariates 
are lagged one period. SIZEt-1 is the logarithm of total assets. Qt-1 is measured as the market value of 
equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by the book value of assets. 
Financing Deficit
 t-1 is the sum of dividends, net investments and net changes in working capital minus 
internal cash flows, scaled by lagged total assets (see Frank and Goyal, 2003). Leveraget-1 is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Robust z-statistic in parentheses. 
Model (1) includes year, country and industry fixed effects. The p-value of Likelihood-ratio (LR) test is 
also reported (in parentheses). ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent 
level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: 	
  
  (1) 
SIZEi,t-1 -0.0839*** 
(-20.16) 
Qi,t-1 -0.0569*** 
(-11.21) 
Financing Deficiti,t-1 0.0086 
(0.32) 
Leveragei,t-1 0.3375*** 
(8.79) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2483 
Observations 7,692 
PROPENSITY SCORE 
LR chi2 (p value) (0.526) 
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TABLE 4: Differences in Operating Performance between Matched Groups of Treatment and Control 
Table 4 provides the differences in means and medians, between cross-delisted firms and their matched control group, of changes in operating performance variables before and after the 
cross-delisting event. Matched samples are constructed using the PSM technique, where each treatment firm is matched to a control firm in the same country, industry and year and with the 
closest propensity score (nearest neighbor with replacement) estimated from equation (1). Percentage changes in operating performance are calculated cumulatively from year t-1 to years t, 
t+1, t+2 and t+3, respectively. This analysis is provided for the entire group of cross-delisted firms (“All”) and for the following groups: involuntary and voluntary before (“Pre-Rule”) and 
after (“Post-Rule”) the passage of the Rule 12h-6. For each group we compute the differences in means and medians between the treatment firms and their corresponding matched controls. 
Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales. Fixed Assets Ratio is property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. Turnover Ratio is total sales scaled by total assets. ROA is 
earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets. ROE is net income after preferred dividends scaled by book value of equity. Differences in means are tested using t- statistic test (t-
statistics in parentheses) and differences in medians are tested using Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-statistics in parentheses). The number of observations (“#”) is reported for both treatment and 
control groups. ***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively. 
  
38 
 
  All   Involuntary   Voluntary: Pre-Rule   Voluntary: Post-Rule 
  From t-1 to: From t-1 to: From t-1 to: From t-1 to: 
  t t+1 t+2 t+3 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t t+1 t+2 t+3   t t+1 t+2 t+3 
% ∆ Sales Growth 
Mean (Treat-Control) -2.18 -6.71 -2.00 -11.64* -1.79 12.60 1.99 18.24 -0.48 -1.18 -2.98 -7.70 -6.97 -37.05** -6.31 -10.34** 
t-test (0.26) (0.66) (0.20) (1.72) (0.10) (0.52) (0.08) (1.27) (0.03) (0.07) (0.19) (0.42) (0.46) (1.98) (0.38) (1.96) 
Median (Treat-Control) -3.23 -0.41 -7.54 -13.74* -4.40 3.77 7.92 17.14 5.13 -13.43 1.07 -21.29 -8.14 -15.34 -9.13 -16.43* 
z-test (0.58) (0.54) (0.04) (1.66) (0.16) (0.36) (0.45) (1.54) (0.12) (0.57) (0.00) (0.85) (0.51) (1.39) (0.63) (1.75) 
% ∆ Fixed Assets 
Mean (Treat-Control)  -0.18 -0.21 -0.47 -0.59 -0.65 -2.48** -4.11*** -4.52** -0.23 0.13 -0.08 -0.09 0.37 0.65 0.94 0.78 
t-test (0.55) (0.44) (0.77) (0.77) (0.67) (2.12) (2.79) (2.42) (0.45) (0.17) (0.10) (0.09) (0.82) (1.10) (1.28) (0.87) 
Median (Treat-Control)  0.06 0.13 0.17 0.55 -0.03 -0.79*** -1.58** -1.85** -0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.08 0.08 0.28 0.32 0.89 
z-test (0.29) (0.42) (0.64) (1.12) (1.61) (3.08) (2.56) (2.04) (0.61) (0.40) (0.60) (0.56) (0.59) (1.06) (1.61) (1.55) 
% ∆ Turnover Ratio 
Mean (Treat-Control) 0.55 0.55 -0.32 -0.61 0.08 -0.52 -0.13 -0.03 1.89 3.21 3.13 2.27 0.51 -0.52 -4.54** -6.75*** 
t-test (0.66) (0.50) (0.25) (0.43) (0.03) (0.14) (0.03) (0.01) (1.53) (1.62) (1.49) (0.84) (0.42) (0.32) (2.41) (2.88) 
Median (Treat-Control)  -0.88 -0.86 -0.46 -1.03 -0.23 -0.59 0.69 0.62 1.09 1.43 1.42 2.24 -1.02 -1.14 -3.02** -3.89*** 
z-test (0.57) (0.25) (0.35) (0.31) (0.97) (0.59) (0.45) (0.34) (1.53) (1.63) (1.45) (1.08) (1.11) (1.08) (2.29) (2.62) 
% ∆ ROA 
Mean (Treat-Control)  1.22 1.79** 1.99** 2.40** 2.80 3.68 3.89 1.99 1.59 3.37** 5.12*** 7.38*** 0.47 -0.19 0.48 -0.15 
t-test (1.62) (2.27) (2.28) (2.38) (1.25) (1.57) (1.33) (0.64) (1.36) (2.54) (3.39) (4.35) (0.59) (0.21) (0.45) (0.11) 
Median (Treat-Control)  0.09 0.51 0.37 0.27 0.20 1.16 1.86 0.92 0.37 1.00** 2.38*** 2.42*** -0.20 -0.26 -0.44 -1.00 
z-test (0.82) (1.15) (1.40) (1.27) (0.45) (1.48) (1.42) (0.51) (1.39) (2.36) (3.71) (4.23) (0.37) (1.05) (0.46) (1.49) 
% ∆ ROE 
Mean (Treat-Control)  3.00 1.77 2.30 0.93 2.80 2.97 -4.70 -7.03 3.92 7.27 9.37 16.32** 0.67 -5.26 -2.00 -12.89*** 
t-test (0.98) (0.53) (0.61) (0.32) (0.28) (0.25) (0.37) (0.48) (0.73) (1.23) (1.44) (2.24) (0.19) (1.62) (0.50) (2.76) 
Median (Treat-Control)  -0.20 -0.22 0.21 0.00 -2.42 0.16 -0.37 -2.47 0.77 1.43 4.08* 6.25*** -0.31 -2.87*** -2.73* -5.44*** 
z-test (0.57) (0.05) (0.13) (0.25) (1.53) (0.26) (0.07) (0.40) (1.55) (1.64) (1.82) (3.40) (0.20) (2.66) (1.80) (3.81) 
# Treated  1191 934 728 554 175 124 93 69 292 249 236 223 381 307 222 148 
# Control 1191 1073 1011 933 607 564 537 497 466 396 333 276 401 318 291 266 
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TABLE 5: Pre- and Post-Cross-Delisting Return Performance 
Table 5 reports mean and median statistics for buy-and-hold return and buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
Matched samples are constructed using the PSM technique, where each treatment firm is matched to a 
control firm by year, country, industry, and with the closest propensity score (nearest neighbor without 
replacement) based on the logarithm of the market value of equity and the book-to-market ratio. Buy-and-
hold returns are monthly returns compounded over a one-year period. Abnormal returns are monthly 
returns compounded over a one-year buy-and-hold investment in treatment firms less monthly returns 
compounded over a one-year buy-and-hold investment of the corresponding matching firms. Differences 
in means are tested using t-statistic test (t-statistic in parentheses) and differences in medians are tested 
using Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-statistic in parentheses). Panel A shows mean and median buy-and-hold 
returns for treatment and control firms. The number of matched pairs (“#”) is also reported. Panel B 
reports the mean and median for abnormal buy-and-hold returns for the treatment group of firms, in the 
pre- and the post-cross-delisting period. The number of observations (“No. Obs”) is also reported. ***, ** 
and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  
Panel A – Buy-and-hold returns for treatment and control firms 
  Buy-and-hold return 
MEAN 
Treatment  0.1236 
Control 0.1943 
Difference -0.0707* 
t-test 1.72 
MEDIAN 
Treatment 0.0017 
Control 0.0435 
Difference -0.0418* 
z-test 1.80 
# Matched Pairs 571 
Panel B – Pre- and Post-Cross-Delisting Abnormal Returns 
Buy-and-hold abnormal return 
  Pre-Delisting Post-Delisting Difference (Post-Pre) 
Mean -0.0551 -0.1631 -0.1080* 
t-test (1.79) 
Median -0.0512 -0.1052 -0.0540 
z-test (1.29) 
No. Obs 389 182   
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TABLE 6: Abnormal Return Performance 
Table 6 reports regression estimates of equation (3) using different specifications. The dependent variable 
is buy-and-hold abnormal return and is measured as monthly returns compounded over a one-year buy-
and-hold investment in treatment firms less monthly returns compounded over a one-year buy-and-hold 
investment in matching firms. Delistt is an indicator variable equal to one if a treatment firm is delisted in 
year t, and zero otherwise. In model (1) we cluster standard errors at firm- and year-level, and in model 
(2) standard errors are clustered at country- and year-level. In model (3) we estimate equation (3) using 
Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) procedure. Regressions include year, industry, and country fixed effects. 
***, ** and * mean statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
  Dependent Variable: Buy-and-hold abnormal return 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Delisti,t -0.2048** -0.2048* -0.2477* 
(-1.98) (-1.80) (-1.83) 
Constant 0.4777** 0.4777* -0.0718** 
(2.35) (1.67) (-2.06) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes No 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No 
Observations 571 571 571 
R-squared 0.104 0.104 0.021 
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